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1 Introduction 
This research focuses on the development of a Bayesian Network (BN) model for modelling 
control system and physical failures of a gas turbine utilised in offshore electrical generation. 
The intention is to model a sequence of events following several component failures, under 
certain conditions and assumptions. These initial failures are defined in two categories: control 
system failures and physical or structural failures (1) (2) (3) (4). This should provide a base 
with which to expand the BN model to facilitate the requirement of having a dynamic risk 
assessment model that allows for accurate representation of the hazards and consequences 
associated with gas turbine fuel gas releases. 
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ABSTRACT: This research proposes the application of Bayesian Networks in conducting 
quantitative risk assessment of the integrity of an offshore gas driven turbine, used for electrical 
power generation. The focus of the research is centred on the potential release of fuel gas from 
a turbine and the potential consequences that follow said release, such as: fire, explosion and 
damage to equipment within the electrical generation module. The Bayesian Network 
demonstrates the interactions of potential initial events & failures, hazards, barriers and 
consequences involved in a fuel gas release. This model allows for quantitative analysis to 
demonstrate partial verification of the model. The verification of the model is demonstrated in 
a series of test cases and through sensitivity analysis. Test case [1] demonstrates the effects of 
individual and combined control system failures within the fuel gas release model; [2] 
demonstrates the effects of the 100% probability of a gas release on the BN model, along with 
the effect of the gas detection system not functioning; [3] demonstrates the effects of inserting 
evidence as a consequence and observing the effects on prior nodes.  
Keywords: Offshore safety, Bayesian networks, offshore installations, electrical generation 
systems, asset integrity. 
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The research presented within this paper is an expansion of previous research conducted for an 
electrical generation system of an offshore installation. The initial research focused on creating 
a dynamic risk assessment model for an electrical generation system, based upon one initial 
component failure in the form of a Rotor Retaining ring failure. The dynamic risk assessment 
model is for application in an Asset Integrity Case. An Asset Integrity Case will enable the user 
to determine the impact of deficiencies in asset integrity on the potential loss of life and 
demonstrate that integrity is being managed to ensure safe operations. The Asset Integrity Case 
is, in principle, an extended Safety Case (5). From the initial research conducted by Loughney 
& Wang (2017) (5) a sequence of events and a BN were produced to demonstrate the cause 
and effect relationships between the safety critical elements of the generator. The BN 
demonstrated a number of potential consequences, such as: Gas Import Riser failure, High 
Pressure Gas Flare Drum failure and Fuel Gas Release & fire. These final consequences were 
not expanded or demonstrated in great detail to keep the complexity of the model as low as 
possible while achieving valid results (3) (4) (6) (7). The model to be presented here is an 
expansion of the previous model, focused on the consequence Fuel Gas release and Fire. In (5) 
fuel gas release and its consequences were represented as one node in the network. This 
research expands on this by constructing a new network to demonstrate the consequence of a 
gas turbine Fuel Gas release in much more detail (5) (8). 
The overall aim of the research is to investigate how a dynamic risk assessment model for gas 
turbine fuel gas release can be developed to facilitate safety assessment for the duty holder, the 
regulatory body and other various parties involved in the oil and gas industry. A key part of the 
study is that it is the development of a logical and consistent risk assessment model, by applying 
Bayesian Network techniques to sequence of events based upon several initiating failures 
within a gas turbine. Furthermore, there is also the possibility of expanding the methodology 
and BN applications in (5) and this study to other areas and industries, as well as in conjunction 
with other techniques.  For Example, Yan, F. et al. apply Bayesian network-bow-tie (BN-bow-
tie) analysis, proposed by mapping bow-tie analysis into Bayesian network (BN) for Analysis 
of gas leaks during biomass gasification (9). 
This paper produces a brief literature review for a background into the research (Section 2), 
outlines a failure scenario on an offshore installation (Section 3), develops a BN model related 
to the outlined problem as well as data issues (Section 4), provides verification of the model 
through test cases and a sensitivity analysis (Section 5), and finally presents a brief conclusion 
(Section 6). 
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2 Background 
Gas turbines are used for a variety of purposes on offshore installations, such as: power 
generation, compression pumping and water injection, most often in remote locations. Gas 
turbines are most commonly duel fuelled, they have the ability to run on fuel taken from the 
production process under normal operations, known as fuel gas. They can also run on diesel 
fuel in emergency circumstances. Typically, offshore gas turbines operate from 1 to 50 MW 
and may well be modified from aero-engines or industrial engines. The most often used gas 
turbines are aeroderivative, particularly for the gas generator. It is known that relatively little 
information is contained within safety cases regarding the operation and safety of gas turbines 
(1) (10) (11). What is contained is the turbine model type, manufacture, ISO power rating (in 
Mega Watts (MW)), the fuel types and the location of the turbine shown on the respective 
installation’s drawings. Additional information can be found on occasion, such as: text 
regarding the power generation package or back-up generators. However, information in 
reference to integrity management and maintenance can be very limited (10). This information, 
or lack of, provides sound reasoning to produce dynamic risk assessment models regarding the 
integrity and safety of gas turbines. 
Industrial power plants are critical systems on board offshore platforms as they supply 
electrical power to safety critical systems, such as: refrigeration systems, HVAC (Heating, 
Ventilation and Air Conditioning), detection systems and fire suppression systems. These 
safety critical systems not only provide safe working for crew and other personnel, they also 
protect the integrity of the offshore platforms systems and structures. All of this protection 
stems from power supplied by the electrical generation systems, which is why offshore 
platforms and marine vessels ensure that they have back-up generators in the event that one or 
two generators fail to operate (11). Usually, on offshore platforms, there are three electrical 
generation systems, with two in the same module and the third in a separate module on a higher 
level which usually acts as the emergency generator. Despite the safety precautions behind the 
number of generators and their locations, there is still the possibility of all generators failing to 
operate (2).  
Furthermore, in recent years there has been a marked increase in fires associated with fuel gas 
leaks with offshore gas turbines. A detailed review of offshore gas turbines incidents conducted 
in 2005 showed that there were 307 hazardous events over 13-year period, from 1991 to 2004. 
The review concerned itself with over 550 gas turbine machines. The analysis concluded that 
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the majority of incidents (approximately 40%) occurred during normal operations, with 
approximately 20% during start-up, another 20% during or after maintenance, 10% occur 
during fuel changeover and the remaining 10% (approximately) occur during other operations. 
With the majority of incidents occurring during normal operations, the fuel gas detection is 
heavily reliant on either turbine fuel detectors and/or fire and gas system detectors. This is due 
to the modules containing the electrical power generators being almost totally unmanned 
during normal operation. Similarly, based upon the review conducted on gas turbines from 
1991 to 2004, approximately 22% of gas leaks remained undetected. Subsequently, 60% of 
those undetected leaks were found to have ignited (10) (12).  
It is situations such as those described that increase the requirement for a dynamic risk 
assessment model to accurately monitor the consequences of failures within gas driven 
generators as they are critical in the survival of crew members as well as the integrity of the 
respective offshore installation. 
3 Fuel Gas Release Model 
This research does not set to outline the fundamentals of BN theory or give the BN 
methodology in detail. The methodology presented in the research by (5) is applied to construct 
this BN model. The model representing the potential for fuel gas release from an offshore gas 
turbine, along with the further consequences of fire and explosion, begins at the point of several 
initiating events. These events are the beginning of the sequence of events and continue through 
the point of potential gas release, the barriers involved in preventing the release and the 
potential consequences should these barriers fail. 
3.1 Assumptions and Limitations 
There are some underlying assumptions and limitations within the model that must be 
explained for the model to be valid and understood. These limitations are split into two groups: 
space & domain limitations and model data limitations (4) (6) (13) (14). 
3.1.1 Space and Domain Limitations 
The purpose of the model is to show the effects that several component failures have on gas 
turbine integrity which can lead to a fuel gas release. Hence, the consequences of said fuel 
release are analysed, and in order to do this, the boundaries of the model need to be defined. 
These boundaries are concerned with the affected area, the detail of the consequences and the 
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ignition types & sources. The outlined assumptions and limitations concerned with the model 
domain are as follows:   
 The model has been built for the situation where the offshore platform contains no crew 
and hence does not consider fatalities. There are two key reasons for this; the first is that 
the BN model is formulated for a NUI (Normally Unattended Installation) Integrity Case, 
where humans are not present on the platform for large periods of time and are monitored 
from other platforms or onshore. Secondly, the BN is part of continual development of an 
Integrity Case which shall focus on maintaining the integrity of the equipment as a priority, 
as well as the effects of incidents on the environment. Hence fatalities are not part of the 
BN model consequences (8).  The model is designed to demonstrate the hazards and consequences associated with the 
fuel gas release from an offshore gas turbine. Hence, the consequences regarding fire and 
explosion are not concerned with the probability of other hydrocarbon releases contributing 
to fires and explosions.   The scope of the model is primarily within the power generation module of a large fixed 
offshore platform. Therefore, the section of the model assigned to the probability of 
equipment damage due to fire and explosion is confined to the equipment and machinery 
located only within the stated module.  The node “Sensor and Instrumentation Failure” denotes failures within the components and 
equipment which are responsible for the key parameters of the gas turbine. These 
parameters include; Fuel flow, pressure, speed, temperature and vibration.  The model is representative of fuel gas being released into the module and not within the 
gas turbine itself. This is due to the fact that should there be a gas release within the turbine, 
it is assumed that the combustion chamber is of sufficient temperature to ignite the fuel. 
However, the presence of an ignition source within the confines of the module is not a total 
certainty. The node “Ignition Source” represents this uncertainty and the possibility of an 
ignition source being present externally of the gas turbine and within the module.  While the level of consequence is confined to the module, and the presence of an ignition 
source is not certain, it is still possible for the gas concentration to reach dangerous levels. 
These dangerous levels do not represent a direct threat to human personnel as it has been 
stated that humans are not present in the module. The dangerous levels relate to the potential 
environmental impact of harmful substances being released into the atmosphere. This is in 
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conjunction with the revised requirement of safety cases for offshore installations to contain 
precautions for potential environmental impact of offshore incidents and accidents (15). 
3.1.2 Model Data Limitations 
It is important that some remarks are made regarding the uniformity of the data within the 
model. Statistics exist in a number of formats and originate from many sources. When 
formulating a model as specific and confined as the one being created, it is almost impossible 
to gather data sets from the same consistent sources. There are some differences in terms of 
data relating to the type of installation operating the same type of gas turbine generator. 
However, the location of the installations is restricted to the UKCS (United Kingdom 
Continental Shelf) and the North Sea. Much of the data represented in the model is adapted 
from gas turbines operating on fixed platforms, yet it is not feasible to obtain data from all 
sources relating to fixed installations. This limitation with the data relates to either the absence 
of data or the lack of appropriate data recording. Hence, data is from fixed installations and 
FPSOs (Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading) which make use of very similar gas 
turbine machines (16) (17).  
There are also differences regarding the age of the data and the data sources used in the Fuel 
Gas Release model. All data utilised is taken from sources post 2002, with the majority of the 
data close to 2002 has been obtained from OREDA-2002 (Offshore Reliability Data) as full 
access to the database at this time was available (18). On the other hand, most of the conditional 
data used to complete the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) for the nodes, in the BN, has 
come from risk assessment projects conducted on offshore installation for gas turbines, with 
the main focus of the projects being hydrocarbon and fuel gas release. Such information can 
be found in (12) (19) (20) (21) (22).  
Finally, most of the nodes are based upon hard evidence statistics, while two of the nodes 
incorporate subjective judgement by utilising a symmetric algorithm from hard evidence. By 
combining information in this way, it allows for situations where there is little to no data to be 
overcome. This process does not compromise the verification and analysis of the model; 
however, it is important to take note of this when interpreting the information presented in the 
results. 
The BN model for a potential fuel gas release is demonstrated by Figure 1. The graphical 
structure of the model is designed to keep the nodes that fall under the same group together and 
organised in a “top down” manner. The five root nodes and the inference node are close 
7 
 
together at the top. The categorised nodes are next in the top down sequence. Continuing from 
the failures there is a potential incident (“Gas Release in Module”), which then leads to the 
barrier nodes. Pending the probability of success or failure of the barriers there is potentially 
another incident (“Continuous Gas Release”). Following from the barriers there are further 
incidents, accidents and consequence nodes which are systematically introduced. One node 
does remain slightly anomalous from this organisation. The root node “Ignition Source” is 
grouped along with the incidents, accidents and consequences as it directly affects one of the 
incidents. 
Figure 1: BN model demonstrating the cause and effect of a potential fuel gas leak from a gas driven electrical generation 
system. 
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Furthermore, there are certain parameters that have been excluded from the model. These 
parameters have been excluded to prevent the model from becoming overly complex. An 
example of one such parameter is the level ventilation in the offshore module and the 
subsequent gas dispersion. This issue of ventilation and dispersion would bring in further 
parameters such as: automated ventilation systems, i.e. HVAC (Heating Ventilation and Air 
Conditioning) and natural ventilation and dispersion, i.e. varying types of weather (wind and 
rain) (10) (12) (23).  
These parameters would allow the model to be much more intricate and complete. However, 
there are many specific parameters that are time based or rely on further specific parameters 
which exponentially increases the complexity of the model. This in turn can hinder the accuracy 
of the model due to the large amount of subjective data required. Hence, the initial nodes 
identified for the BN (nodes 1, 2 ,3, 4, 5 and the inference node) are all internal failures within 
the gas turbine that can be measured accurately, in terms of their reliability and integrity. 
Despite these additional parameters not being included, the integrity of the BN model is not 
compromised, as the scope of the model is still valid.  
4 Data for the Fuel Gas Release Model 
The BN model for fuel gas release has been kept as simple as possible while still maintaining 
a coherent, accurate and logical pathway from the initial root nodes to the final consequences. 
This level of complexity has allowed CPTs to be manageable when it comes to gathering data. 
While the majority of the connections in the model are simple converging and diverging 
connections, consisting mostly of two arc connections in each connection type, there are two 
nodes which are the result of triple converging connections (13) (14) (24). In terms of the size 
of the CPTs, this is not a huge issue. However, due to the subject of these nodes (“Control 
System Failure” and “Physical/Structural Failures”) there is little to no hard data available to 
complete their CPTs. It is possible to compile data for the rest of the nodes based upon current 
literature, databases (primarily for the root nodes) and actual risk assessment project data.  
As it is not possible to utilise hard data sources to complete the CPTs of nodes 6 and 7 (“Control 
System Failures” and “Physical/Structural Failures”) while still maintaining a high degree of 
accuracy, other techniques must be used. In this case a variation of the Symmetric Method 
(demonstrated in (5)) is applied to the CPTs of nodes 6 and 7. 
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4.1 Establishing the Conditional Probabilities 
When constructing a BN the prior probabilities are required to be assigned locally to the 
probability link, P(Parent(Ai)) → P(Child(Bi)), as a conditional probability, P(Bi|Ai), where i 
represents the ith state of the parent node and the child node. However, it is not always a 
straightforward process to obtain the relevant data. In principle, the majority of the data can be 
acquired through failure databases or experimentation. However, designing and conducting 
experiments can prove difficult and historical data does not always satisfy the scope of certain 
nodes and CPTs within a BN. Therefore, in practice, it is necessary to rely on subjective 
probabilities provided by expert judgement as an expression of an individual’s degree of belief. 
However, since subjective probabilities are based on informed judgements, it is possible for 
deviation to occur when the data is expressed as precise numbers (25) (13).  
It can be seen in (5) that a fully subjective approach has been applied to construct certain CPTs 
in the BN. This involved experts providing their judgement through a Pairwise Comparison 
(PC) method. The data from the PC is further analysed using Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) and relative importance weights were determined from this for each parent node in 
question. These weights are then applied to an algorithm that allows a large child CPT to be 
constructed cell by cell. This method of compiling data for large CPTs proved simple to 
implement and produced accurate results for the BN. However, it was found that a time-
consuming part was the gathering of data from domain experts through PC in questionnaires.  
Therefore, the data gathering process was amended by utilising hard data from risk assessment 
experimentation and historical data to determine relative weights of nodes as opposed to 
applying PC and AHP. This entails utilising hard data from the individual parent and child 
node relationships, to create relative weights for the parent nodes and apply those to the 
symmetric method algorithm.  
4.2 Symmetric Method utilising hard data 
The symmetric method provides an input algorithm which consists of a set of relative weights 
that quantify the relative strengths of the influences of the parent-nodes on the child-node, and 
a set of probability distributions the number of which grows only linearly, as opposed to 
exponentially, with the number of associated parent-nodes. Yet the most common method of 
gathering the required data for the algorithm is to use expert judgements. However, it is also 
possible to utilise the symmetric method with historic data and experimentation. While it is 
very difficult or not possible to complete a large CPT in a BN using hard data, it is possible to 
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obtain key conditional probabilities for a node. For example, node 6, the chance node 
representing “Control System Failure”, has three parent nodes each with two states. This 
produces a parental distribution in the order of 23. While this does not seem a large CPT, the 
nature of the node’s scope limits the level of available data, and hence cannot be completed 
fully with hard data. However, it is possible to obtain key conditional probabilities and apply 
them to the symmetric method to complete the CPT. 
The symmetric method in its entirety will not be outlined in this paper as this research is an 
expansion of research conducted in (5) and (24). The work by Loughney & Wang (2017) and 
Das (2008) explains how the symmetric method assumes that the CPTs in the BN grow linearly 
not exponentially. Therefore, it is possible to produce a simple CPT for the child node where 
the effect of all parents is the identical. The symmetric method then applies these compatible 
child probabilities to a weighted sum algorithm. This algorithm applies a weight to each of the 
parent nodes and produces each individual conditional probability in the CPT by combining 
the compatible probabilities, given the state of the child node, and the relative weights of the 
parent nodes. The weighted sum algorithm is given in Equation 1. 
 �(ܦ௟| ܣ௦భ ,  ܤ௦మ ,  … ,  ݊௦�) =  ∑ ��௡�=ଵ . �(ܦ௟  | {ܥ݋݉݌ሺܣ = ���  ሻ})           ݈ = Ͳ,ͳ, … , ݉         �� = ͳ, ʹ, … , �݇ 
   (1) 
Equation 1 demonstrates that the probability of event D, in state l, is given by the probability 
of the parents in the states j of the set of states’ S. In this algorithm the set of states, S, is vital 
as the set of states for each parent must be the same i.e.: “Yes” and “No”. This conditional 
probability of Dl
 
is given by the sum of the product of the relative weights of each parent and 
each linear compatible parental configuration.  
4.2.1 Calculating the relative weights 
Figure 2 demonstrates the situation in the BN of nodes 1, 2, 3 & 6 with the notation A, B, C & 
D respectively. While it is not possible to accurately obtain P(D|A, B, C) or even P(D|A, B) 
through historical or experimental data. It is possible to obtain the conditional probability of 
event Z given the individual parents, i.e. P(D|A), P(D|B) and P(D|C).  These conditional 
probabilities can be used to develop normalised weights for the parent nodes. 
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As mentioned previously, in the symmetric model the individual local conditional probabilities 
of the parent to child can be distributed by relative importance for the associated child node, 
i.e. the normalised weight. Hence, in normal space and using the notation outlined in Table 1, 
the probability of D being of state “Yes” given that the probability of A being in state “Yes” is 
equal to ܺ̂஺, where ܺ̂஺ is the relative importance of the parent node A. This is applied across all 
of the parent nodes and is demonstrated by Equation 4 (25). �ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|ܣ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ =  �(ܺ̂஺) = �ሺ ஺ܺሻ∑ �ሺܺ௠ሻ௡௠=஺  
…              (2) �ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|݊ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ =  �(ܺ̂௡) = �ሺܺ௡ሻ∑ �ሺܺ௠ሻ௡௠=஺  
Therefore, 
∑ �ሺܺ௠ሻ௡௠=஺ = �ሺ ஺ܺሻ + �ሺܺ஻ሻ + ⋯ + �ሺܺ௡ሻ 
In normalised space, based on the influence of each parent node, the conditional probability of 
a binary child node D given each binary parent node, Xr , where r =  A, B, ..., n., can be estimated 
by Equation 5. �ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|ܣ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ =  �ଵ �ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|ܤ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ =  �ଶ 
…              (3) 
A C 
D 
B 
Figure 2: Sample BN representing 3 parents and 1 child 
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�ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|݊ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ =  �௡ 
∑ �௥ = �ଵ + �ଶ + ⋯ + �௡ = ͳ௡௥=ଵ  
Following from Equations 4 and 5, it is possible to calculate the weights of the parents given 
the individual parent to child conditional probabilities (25).  
In order to demonstrate the calculation of relative weights for parent nodes, the section of the 
BN containing nodes 1, 2, 3, and 6, shown in Figure 1, shall be used as an example. Table 1 
shows the local conditional probabilities for the child node “Control System Failure” given 
each individual parent node. These values were able to be determined from historical data (18). 
The notation outlined in Figure 2 is also applied for simplicity. 
Table 1: Individual conditional probabilities for Control System Failure 
Control 
System 
Failure 
Exceed System 
Capability 
Sensor and 
Instrumentation 
Failure 
System Defects Sum  
D A B C  
  Yes Yes Yes   
Yes 0.0584 0.0610 0.1330 0.2524 
 
The information presented in Table 2 can be represented as follows: �ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|ܣ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ = Ͳ.ͲͷͺͶ = �ሺ ஺ܺሻ �ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|ܤ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ = Ͳ.Ͳ͸ͳͲ = �ሺܺ஻ሻ �ሺܦ = ǲܻ��ǳ|ܥ = ǲܻ��ǳሻ = Ͳ.ͳ͵͵Ͳ = �ሺܺ஼ሻ 
∑ �ሺܺ௠ሻ௡௠=஺ = Ͳ.ʹͷʹͶ 
Hence, with the individual conditional probabilities, the relative weights of the parent nodes 
can be calculated utilising Equation 4. �(ܺ̂஺) = �ሺ ஺ܺሻ∑ �ሺܺ௠ሻ௡௠=஺ = Ͳ.ͲͷͺͶͲ.ʹͷʹͶ = Ͳ.ʹ͵ͳͶ = �ଵ �(ܺ̂஻) = �ሺܺ஻ሻ∑ �ሺܺ௠ሻ௡௠=஺ = Ͳ.Ͳ͸ͳͲͲ.ʹͷʹͶ = Ͳ.ʹͶͳ͹ = �ଶ 
13 
 
�(ܺ̂஼) = �ሺܺ஼ሻ∑ �ሺܺ௠ሻ௡௠=஺ = Ͳ.ͳ͵͵ͲͲ.ʹͷʹͶ = Ͳ.ͷʹ͸ͻ = �ଷ 
Following from this, Equation 3 shows that the summation of the relative weights should be 
equal to 1, as follows: 
∑ �௥ =௡௥=ଵ Ͳ.ʹ͵ͳͶ + Ͳ.ʹͶͳ͹ + Ͳ.ͷʹ͸ͻ = ͳ 
As the relative weights for parent nodes A, B and C have been calculated and assigned 
accordingly, they can be combined with the linear compatible parental configurations identified 
in Equations 1, 2 and 3. This combination forms the basis of the weighted sum algorithm, and 
from this the CPT can be calculated.  
It is possible to apply the weighted sum algorithm, shown in Equation 1, as the following 
information has been identified: 
i) The relative weights of the parent nodes w1 , ... , wn , and, 
ii) The k1+  ... + kn probability distributions over event D, of the linear type, for 
compatible parental configurations as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Distribution over D for Compatible Parental Configurations 
Probability Distribution over D S1 = Yes S2 = No 
P(D = Yes|{Comp(A, B, C = Sj)}) 0.936 0.064 
P(D = No|{Comp(A, B , C = Sj)}) 0.064 0.936 
 
The relative weight algorithm is applied to all cells within the relevant CPT to obtain the full 
conditional probability distribution. The completed CPTs for the BN Model can be found in 
Appendix A. Continuing on from the data acquisition and analysis process, it is possible to 
complete the BN by completing the CPTs and ascertaining the marginal probabilities for the 
nodes and conduct several test cases to validate the BN model. Table 3 summarises the origins 
of the data for each node in the initial BN model. There were several sources of literature. For 
example, node 10 was determined from historical data sources, such as OREDA and HSE 
databases, whilst, in comparison, data for node 17 is from (8) (16) (19) and (22). 
Table 3 also contains the number of states for each node and the number of permutations to 
demonstrate an idea of how data had to be broken down before being inserted into the 
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corresponding CPT. Similarly, Figure 3 shows the marginal probabilities for each node in the 
BN. 
 
Table 3: details of each nodes CPT and their data sources 
 
Node Node Name States Parents 
Permutations in 
probability table 
Data Sources 
Transfer node from Initial BN 
0 
Fuel Gas Feed 
Impact 
2 1 4 Literature 
Initial Events/Roots 
1 
Exceed System 
Capability 
2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
2 
Sensor and 
Instrumentation 
Failure 
2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
3 System Defects 2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
4 
Structural Support 
Failure 
2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
5 Corrosion 2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
14 Ignition Source 2 0 2 Literature (DB1 & HD2) 
Categorized Initial Events 
6 
Control System 
Failure 
2 3 16 
Literature with subjective 
analysis 
7 
Physical/Structural 
Failures 
2 3 16 
Literature with subjective 
analysis 
Barriers 
9 Gas Detection 2 2 8 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
10 TCS Shut Off Fuel 2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
11 
F&G System Shut 
Off Fuel 
2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
13 Fuel Supply Off 2 2 8 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
Incidents/Accidents 
8 Fuel Gas Release 2 2 8 Literature (HD2) 
12 
Continuous Gas 
Release 
2 2 8 Literature (HD2) 
15 
Immediate/Delayed 
ignition 
3 2 12 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
16 Fire 2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
17 Explosion 2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
Consequences 
18 Consequences 3 2 18 Literature (HD2) 
19 
Damage due to Fire 
& Explosion 
2 2 8 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
20 
Damage to 
Adjacent areas 
2 1 4 Literature (HD2 & RA3) 
1DB: Data has been utilised form Failure Databases, such as OREDA and OGP. 
2HD: Data has been utilised from Historical Data in literature, such as; Journals and HSE reports. 
3RA: Data has been utilised from Risk Assessment projects conducted by companies such as: RMRI Plc., 
Maersk, and Lloyd’s Register. 
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5 Fuel Gas Release Model Test Cases and Sensitivity Analysis 
Case studies are important for demonstrating how research can be put into practice. The Fuel 
Gas Release model is now used to analyse a series of possible real-world scenarios. The 
variable from the external BN, i.e. the transfer node “Fuel Gas Feed Impact”, is to remain 
unchanged and only those directly linked to the study for Fuel Gas Release shall be altered 
using the Hugin software. The Hugin software allows for evidence to be inserted to all nodes 
within the network in its “Run Mode” function. This evidence is to the degree of 100% in a 
Figure 3: Marginal probabilities for each node within the Fuel Gas Release BN 
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given state of a node. It is the posterior probabilities that are of interest and are computed given 
particular evidence of specific nodes. 
The focus of the BN model is on the effects of the initial failures on the likelihood of a gas 
release, as well as the performance of the barriers designed to mitigate against the escalation 
of a release to further, more severe incidents. Furthermore, the model analysis shall 
demonstrate the probability of possible consequences that may arise given that these barriers 
do not perform their required function. As well as the potential for further escalation given 
other external factors, such as, the presence of an ignition source. The model also allows for 
the comparison of combined effects of various, simultaneous failures and their combined effect 
on the probability of events. There are a number of test cases which shall demonstrate the 
effects of different scenarios on the potential of a gas release and the possibility of fire and/or 
explosions. Similarly, to add to the verification of the model through these test cases, the effect 
of initially observing a consequence, such as, a leak or an ignition, is demonstrated through the 
change in the probability of the prior nodes. This is a potential route to identifying the main 
unknown cause of a consequence.  
It is important to note that before any evidence is inserted into the model, the probabilities of 
“Continuous Release = Yes” and “Consequence = Y-Leak” are quite high. This is because they 
are directly affected by the “Gas Detection” node. Before evidence is inserted, the “Gas 
Detection” node shows a low probability of detection, and hence the model assumes a higher 
probability of a release. It can be seen in the test cases that once the probability of detection 
inadvertently increases because of the presence of fuel gas, the probability of a leak 
(demonstrated by the “Consequence” node) as a consequence reduces. The effects of the 
detection system failing are demonstrated in the test cases to ascertain the severity of the 
probability changes to the potential consequences. 
The primary purpose of test case 1 is to demonstrate a degree of verification of the model by 
demonstrating that the behaviour of the probabilities is akin to a real-world scenario. Test case 
2 shall demonstrate the effects, on the BN, of a barrier failure along with the presence of an 
ignition source. Furthermore, test case 3 shall demonstrate the effects on prior probabilities 
given evidence inserted in the consequence node. Finally, a sensitivity analysis shall provide 
further verification utilising the Parameter Sensitivity Wizard in the Hugin software. 
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5.1 Test Case 1: Control System and Physical/Structural Failures 
This case study demonstrates the effects of individual and combined control system failures 
within the fuel gas release model. This case study is split into four test cases: 1A) is a 
demonstration of the effects of control system failures on the network, 1B) is a demonstration 
of the control system failures with the presence of an ignition source, 1C) is a demonstration 
of the effects of Physical/Structural failures on the network, and 1D) is a demonstration of the 
effects of Physical/Structural failures on the network with the presence of an ignition source. 
In the analysis of all test cases, the process of “inserting evidence” stipulates that the state in 
question is assumed to have occurred. This means that the probability within the BN is set to 
100%.  
5.1.1 Test Case 1A: Control System Failures without Ignition 
In the context of the presented model, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas turbine 
due to the turbines control system, is mostly dependent on three key events: “Exceeding System 
Capability” (ESC), “Sensor and Instrumentation Failure” (SIF) and “System Defects” (SD). 
These events can occur either individually or in conjunction with each other. The effect on the 
likelihood of a gas release is demonstrated along with the effects on the fuel shut off system, 
with the subsequent consequences also demonstrated. In this case the likelihood of a continuous 
fuel release is analysed as well as the probability of the “Consequence” node being in states 
“Y-Leak” and “None”. It is not key to analyse the “Y-Ignition” state as this test case does not 
include the possibility of an ignition source.  
The results are presented by means of a bar chart (Figure 4) which shows the probabilities of 
gas release, fuel shut off, continuous release, the consequences and the effect on the overall 
control system failure, on the y-axis. The x-axis shows which individual event is presumed to 
be occurring. From the results it is evident that a major system defect would have the greatest 
effect on the probability of the gas release, as shown by the increase in probability from 57.85% 
without evidence, to 69.5% when a potential system defect causes a failure. It can be seen that 
the effect of a system defect in the control system produces significant changes in the likelihood 
of there not being a consequence due to the increase in the probability in gas release. The key 
information to be taken is the significance in the change of posterior probability’s given the 
evidence inserted. This method provides a basic sensitivity analysis along with probability 
interpretation. Furthermore, the likelihood of consequences and continuous release decreases 
with the inserted evidence in control system failures as it is assumed in the model that the gas 
detection system has no reason to not function correctly at this stage. Therefore, the increase 
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in the probability and level of gas release will increase the probability of gas detection and 
hence the probability that the fuel will be shut off. This is a scenario that would be expected in 
a real-world situation. 
 
5.1.2 Test Case 1B: Control System Failures with Ignition 
As stated in test case 1A, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas turbine due to the 
turbines control system, is dependent on three key initial events: “Exceeding System 
Capability”, “Sensor and Instrumentation Failure” and “System Defects”. This test case 
expands upon the findings in case 1A by demonstrating the control system failures along with 
the presence of an Ignition Source (IS). This will illustrate the effect the initial failures has on 
the accident and consequence nodes. The results are again presented in a bar chart (Figure 5) 
which shows the probability of gas detection, immediate or delayed ignition, explosion, fire, 
the potential damage incurred and the overall consequences on the y-axis. The x-axis shows 
the nodes where evidence has been input. The first column in the table in Figure 5 shows the 
probability of there being no evidence inserted in the control system nodes but does indicate 
that there is an ignition source. 
Figure 4: Effects of the turbine control system failures on the posterior probabilities of "Gas Release", "Fuel Shut Off", 
"Continuous Gas Release" and "Consequence; States: Y-Leak & None" 
No Evidence ESC SIF SD
CSF 6.92 27.1 27.8 52.3
Gas Release 57.85 63 63.18 69.5
Fuel Off 35.39 38.43 38.53 42.25
Continuous Release 62.48 59.21 59.09 55.08
Y-Leak 64.56 61.53 61.43 57.71
None 35.41 38.45 38.55 42.27
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 From the graph it can be seen that the probability of there being a gas release, given any of the 
initial failures, is the same as test case 1A despite there being an ignition source present. This 
provides some verification to the model as it indicates that the nodes, “Ignition Source” and 
“Gas Release” should be, and are, independent from each other. Furthermore, as with test case 
1A, the initial event “System Defects” demonstrates the largest effects on the model. It can also 
be seen that the probability of gas detection increases proportionally to the probability of gas 
release. This affects the relationship between the probability of detection and the probability of 
accidents and consequence. For example, in the event that there is only an ignition source 
present the probability of there being either fire or an explosion increases from 0.0113% to 
13.56% and 0.0187% to 22.51% respectively (for marginal probabilities refer to Figure 3). This 
shows how the significant the presence of an ignition source is to the probability of fire and 
explosion before any other evidence is inserted. Continually, when evidence is then inserted 
into the “System Defects” node, the posterior probabilities for fire and explosion decrease from 
13.56% to 12.12% and 22.51% to 20.12%. This is because the probability of the gas detection 
increases with the probability of the gas release, as it is assumed that the gas detectors function 
as expected. Furthermore, this in turn has an effect on the fuel gas shut off by increasing the 
probability that fuel gas will be shut off. Hence the probability that a fire or explosion will 
occur decreases. 
Figure 5: Effects of Turbine Control System failures, with an ignition source present, on the posterior probabilities of "Gas 
Detection", "Consequences", "Immediate/Delayed Ignition", "Explosion", "Fire" and "Damage due to Fire & Explosion" 
100% IS ESC SIF SD
Gas Release 57.85 63 63.18 69.5
Gas Detection 43.4 47.25 47.38 52.1
Y-Ignition 29.34 27.97 27.92 26.23
Y-Leak 9.29 8.85 8.84 8.3
Immediate 23.13 22.04 22.01 20.68
Delayed 32.2 30.69 30.64 28.78
Explosion 22.51 21.45 21.42 20.12
Fire 13.56 12.93 12.9 12.12
F&Ex Damage 2.55 2.44 2.43 2.29
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
(%
)
20 
 
5.1.3 Test Case 1C: Physical/Structural Failures without Ignition 
Test cases 1C and 1D are similar to the previous cases, 1A and 1B, in that they demonstrate 
the effects of initial failures on the BN model both with and without an ignition source present. 
However, test cases 1C and 1D are concerned with the effects that physical and structural 
failures potentially have on the BN model. It is important to specify that the analysis in the 
Hugin BN software is applied to only discrete chance nodes and therefore the inference node 
“Fuel Gas Feed Impact” is not included in the analysis. Figure 6 shows the effects of the 
individual initial events, “Structural Support Failure” (SSF) and “Corrosion” (Cor.), on the 
posterior probabilities of gas release, fuel shut off, continuous release, the consequences (states 
“Y-leak” and “None”) and the effect on the overall physical failure, on the y-axis. The x-axis 
shows the individual event which is assumed to be occurring.  
From the graph in Figure 6 it can be seen that of the two events, represented as chance nodes, 
corrosion demonstrates the largest effect on a potential fuel gas release. It is evident that a 
failure caused by corrosion would have the greatest effect on the probability of the gas release, 
as shown by the increase in probability from 57.85% without evidence, to 70.01% when 
corrosion potentially causes a failure. Similarly, a failure caused by corrosion also produces 
the largest percentage change in the likelihood that a consequence will not occur. The effects 
Figure 6: Effects of the physical and structural failures on the posterior probabilities of "Gas Release", "Fuel Shut Off", 
"Continuous Gas Release" and "Consequence; States: Y-Leak & None" 
No Evidence SSF Cor.
PSF 40.88 67.4 69.59
Gas Release 57.85 69.21 70.01
Fuel Off 35.39 42.08 42.55
Continuous Release 62.48 55.27 54.76
Y-Leak 64.56 57.88 57.41
None 35.41 42.1 42.57
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that a failure, due to corrosion, has on the posterior probabilities in the model also represents 
the largest percentage change out of the five initial events.  
As with the previous test cases, the probability of there being a leak consequence and 
continuous gas release decreases with the insertion of evidence at the root nodes, due to the 
probability of a release being detected given an increase in the probability that a release will 
occur. Furthermore, as with test case 1A the key information be taken is the significance in the 
change of posterior probability’s given the evidence inserted. This method provides a basic 
sensitivity analysis along with probability interpretation, as well as verification to the BN 
model. 
5.1.4 Test Case 1D: Physical/Structural Failures with Ignition 
As stated in test case 1C, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas turbine due to the 
physical and structural failures, is dependent on key initial events: “Structural Support 
Failures”, and “Corrosion”. This test case expands upon the findings in test case 1C by again 
demonstrating the individual effects of the physical and structural failures along with the 
presence of an Ignition Source. This will illustrate the effect the initial failures has on the 
accident and consequence nodes. The results are again presented in a bar chart (Figure 7). This 
shows the probability of gas detection, immediate or delayed ignition, explosion, fire, the 
Figure 7: Effects of Physical and Structural failures, with an ignition source present, on the posterior probabilities of "Gas 
Detection", "Consequences", "Immediate/Delayed Ignition", "Explosion", "Fire" and "Damage due to Fire & Explosion" 
100% IS SSF Cor.
Gas Release 57.85 69.21 70.01
Gas Detection 43.4 51.88 52.48
Y-Ignition 29.34 26.31 26.1
Y-Leak 9.29 8.33 8.26
Immediate 23.13 20.74 20.57
Delayed 32.2 28.87 28.63
Explosion 22.51 20.18 20.01
Fire 13.56 12.16 12.06
F&Ex Damage 2.55 2.29 2.27
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potential damage incurred and the overall consequences on the y-axis. The x-axis shows the 
nodes where evidence has been input. The first column of the table in Figure 8 shows the 
probability of there being no evidence inserted in the control system nodes but does indicate 
that there is an ignition source. 
From the graph it can be seen that the probability of there being a gas release, given any of the 
initial failures, is the same as test case 1C despite there being an ignition source present. This 
again provides some partial verification to the model as it indicates the nodes that should be 
independent from each other, such as, “Ignition Source” and “Gas Release”. This has 
previously been demonstrated in test case 1B. Furthermore, as with test case 1C, the initial 
event “Corrosion” demonstrates the largest effects on the model. It can also be seen, as with 
test case 1B, that the probability of gas detection increases proportionally to the probability of 
gas release. This affects the relationship between the probability of detection and the 
probability of accidents and consequence. In the event that there is only an ignition source 
present the probability of there being either fire or an explosion is identical to the percentage 
increase demonstrated in test case 1C, when only an ignition source is present.  
When evidence is then inserted into the “Corrosion” node, the posterior probabilities for fire 
and explosion decrease from 13.56% to 12.06% and 22.51% to 20.01%, respectively. This is 
because the probability of the gas detection increases with the probability of the gas release, as 
with test case 1B. The percentage changes demonstrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7 show that the 
event “Corrosion” has the greatest effect on posterior probabilities in the BN model of all of 
the initial events. 
Test cases 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D demonstrate the cause and effect relationship that the five initial 
events have on the posterior probabilities in the BN model. The sixth root node (node 8), 
“Ignition Source”, is also applied to the analysis to demonstrate the combined effects of the 
initial events with an ignition source present. This established some partial verification to the 
model as the posterior probabilities are increased and decreased as one would expect given 
evidence inserted at the root nodes. One key element demonstrated in the four test cases is that 
of the relationship between gas release and gas detection. As the probability of there being gas 
released increases, the probability of gas detection proportionally increases. This is because in 
a real scenario, it is assumed that when gas is present in the offshore module, the gas detectors 
would sense it and hence the gas would be shut off, either by the Turbine Control System (TCS) 
or the Fire & Gas system (F&G). This, as demonstrated by the test cases, decreases the 
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probability of an accident or severe consequences. However, it is important to demonstrate the 
effects a dysfunctional barrier, such as the gas detection system, has on the posterior 
probabilities of the BN model. Test case 2 outlines this type of scenario. 
5.2 Test Case 2: Gas Release and No Detection with and without an Ignition 
Source 
This case study demonstrates the effects of the probability of a gas release being 100% “Yes” 
on the BN model. Along with the gas release, the effect of the gas detection not functioning 
will also be analysed, i.e. Gas Detection being 100% “No”. Therefore, this case study is split 
into two test cases: 2A) is a demonstration of the effects of a gas release and no gas detection 
without an ignition source, and 2B) is a demonstration of the effects of no gas detection 
combined with an ignition source being present. 
5.2.1 Test Case 2A: Gas Release – 100% “Yes”, Gas Detection 100% “No”, without an 
ignition source 
In the context of the presented model, the probability of a fuel gas release from a gas turbine 
due to the turbines control system, is dependent on five key events: “Exceeding System 
Capability”, “Sensor and Instrumentation Failure”, “System Defects”, “Structural Support 
Failure” and “Corrosion”. In test case 2A is assumed that one or more of these events have 
occurred and a Gas Release (GR) is observed. In this case the likelihood of a continuous fuel 
release is analysed as well as the probability of the “Consequence” node being in states “Y-
Leak” and “None”. It is not key to analyse the “Y-Ignition” state as this test case does not 
include the possibility of an ignition source. The analysis is presented in Figure 8.  
From the graph in Figure 8 it can be seen that when there is 100% chance of a fuel gas release, 
the probability of gas detection increases from 43.4% to 74.87%. This is due to the assumption 
that the gas detection system functions as expected, i.e. in the event of a gas release it is 
assumed, with some confidence, that the gas detection system will detect the gas in the 
atmosphere and the fuel will be shut off. This is also demonstrated by the posterior probability 
of the three fuel shut off nodes: “TCS”, “F&G” and “Fuel Shut Off”. Given a 100% probability 
of a gas release and hence a 74.866% probability of gas detection, the posterior probabilities 
of the fuel being shut off is as follows: i) the probability of TCS shutting off fuel increases 
from 27.76% to 47.47%, ii) the probability of F&G system shutting off fuel increases from 
20.37% to 34.7%, and iii) the probability that the fuel will be shut off completely, increases 
from 35.39% to 60.19%.  
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Similarly, the posterior probabilities of a continuous release and the consequence of a severe 
leak decrease from 58.81% to 29.26% and 64.56% to 39.78% respectively. This shows that the 
BN model can represent the behaviour of safety barriers in the event of a fuel gas leak. 
Furthermore, while the posterior probabilities of a consequence and continuous release still 
seem substantial, it is the significance of the change in probability that is of importance. These 
significant changes demonstrate that the barriers have a large effect on the mitigating of 
accidents and consequences regarding offshore systems. However, the importance of these 
barriers can also be demonstrated by assuming that they do not function or are simply not 
present. 
From the graph in Figure 8 it can be seen that the right most column shows the posterior 
probabilities given that the “Gas Detection” (GD) has a 100% chance of failing or not 
functioning. The graph and data table show that in the event that there is a gas release and the 
gas detectors do not function then there is a very high probability of there being a gas leak as 
a consequence as well as a continuous leak from the system. The continuous leak would occur 
because the fuel shut off systems would not react to the gas detection. This effect can be seen 
in the posterior probabilities of the fuel shut off systems. In the event that gas detection is in 
state “No=100%”, then the resulting potential probabilities that the fuel will be shut off by 
either the TCS or the F&G system are as follows: i) the probability that the TCS shuts off the 
fuel decreases from 27.76% to 0.58%, ii) the probability that the F&G system shuts off the fuel 
Figure 8: Effects of “Gas Release” being “Yes=100%” and “Gas Detection” being “No=100%” on “Consequences”, 
“Continuous Gas Release”, “Fuel Shut Off” (TCS, F&G and Fuel Off) and “Gas Detection” 
No Evidence GR (Yes) GD (No)
Consequence, None 35.41 60.2 1.22
Y-Leak 64.56 39.78 98.74
Continuous Release 58.81 29.26 99.565
TCS 27.76 47.47 0.58
F&G 20.37 34.7 0.61
Fuel off 35.39 60.19 1.182
Gas Detection 43.4 74.866 0
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decreases from 20.37% to 0.61%, and iii) the probability that the fuel will be shut off by either 
or both systems decreases from 35.37% to 1.18%. This illustrates the dependency that the fuel 
shut off systems have on the operational of the gas detection system. Furthermore, given a gas 
release and no gas detection, it can be seen that the probability of a continuous gas release 
increases from 58.81% to 99.57%, and the probability of a gas leak as a consequence increases 
from 64.56% to 98.74%. The significance of these percentage increases in the posterior 
probabilities indicates that the gas detection system is a vital barrier in the mitigation of 
accidents resulting from fuel gas releases.  
However, this analysis considers only the repercussions of a fuel gas release without the 
possibility of an ignition source being present. In the event that there is a gas release and the 
gas detection system fails to operate as required, the fuel has a high probability to continue to 
be released and accumulate in the offshore module. This poses a huge issue should the gas 
release not be discovered by means other than the gas detection system. In the event that an 
ignition source is present, there is potential to cause a fire or an explosion. It is understood that 
should the gas be allowed to continuously release and accumulate, there is an ever increasing 
probability that an explosion will occur. Hence, it is vital that this scenario be analysed to show 
the potential, significant alterations to the occurrence probabilities of accidents and severe 
consequences. Test case 2B shall analyse the effects of an ignition source given that a fuel gas 
release is not detected. 
5.2.2 Test Case 2B: Gas Detection 100% “No” with an Ignition Source present 
As demonstrated in test case 2A, it is assumed that one or more events has led to a gas release 
being observed. In this case the likelihood of a continuous fuel release was analysed as well as 
the probability of the “Consequence” node being in states “Y-Leak” and “None”. However, in 
this test case, the emphasis shall be on a gas release not being detected as well as the effects 
that an ignition source has on the posterior probabilities of several nodes. The nodes in question 
are: “Consequences” (States: “Y-Ignition” and “Y-Leak”), “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” 
(States: “Immediate” and “Delayed”), “Explosion”, “Fire”, “Damage due to Fire & Explosion” 
and “Explosion Damage to Adjacent Areas”. The effects of the analysis are to be analysed both 
as individual occurrences and a cumulative occurrence. Figure 9 shows the individual effects 
of No Gas release Detected (NGD) and the presence of an Ignition Source (IS).  
The emphasis in this analysis is on the more severe accidents and consequences in terms of fire, 
explosion and the damage that they can cause. From the graph in Figure 9 it can be seen that 
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in the event of a 100% failure of the gas detection system, the probability of there being and 
accidents or consequences related to ignition remain virtually negligible. It can been seen that 
the probability of there being a gas leak as a consequence, however, increases from 64.56% to 
98.74%. This first stage of the test case demonstrates that the ignition related accidents and 
consequences have a very unlikely occurrence probability, according to the BN model, unless 
there are both a fuel source and an ignition source present.  
The third column in Figure 9 demonstrates the effects on the fire & explosion consequences 
given only an ignition source present, assuming that the probability of a gas release is at the 
marginal probability of 57.85%. The purpose of this is to show how sensitive the fire & 
explosion consequences are given an ignition source and a likely chance of a gas release. It can 
be seen that the posterior probabilities increase drastically when an ignition source is present. 
The probability that there will be a delayed ignition demonstrates the largest percentage change 
to the posterior probability as it increases from 0.03% to 44.67%, with the probability of an 
immediate ignition increasing from 0.02% to 23.13%. Furthermore, the second largest 
percentage change to the posterior probabilities is the likelihood of there being ignition as a 
consequence, as it increases from 0.02% to 29.34%. Figure 9 also shows that the probability of 
Figure 9: Effects of “Gas Detection” being “No=100%” and “Ignition Source” being “Yes=100%” on “Consequences” 
(States “Y-Ignition” and “Y-Leak”), “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” (States “Immediate” and “Delayed”), “Explosion”, 
“Fire”, “Damage due to Fire & Explosion” 
No Evidence NGD IS
Y-Ignition 0.02 0.04 29.34
Y-Leak 64.56 98.74 9.29
Immediate 0.02 0.03 23.13
Delayed 0.03 0.04 44.67
Explosion 0.02 0.03 22.50
Fire 0.01 0.02 13.50
F&Ex Damage 0.00 0.00 2.55
Adjacent Mod. 4.10E-05 6.31E-05 0.049
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there being only a gas leak as a consequence decreases from 64.56% to 9.29% due to the 
increased probability of there being an immediate or delayed ignition.  
The second stage of Test Case 2B is to demonstrate the cumulative effects of the fuel gas not 
being detected and the presence of an ignition source, as shown by Figure 10. It can be seen 
that the second column in Figure 10 that the probabilities are only the posterior probabilities 
given no gas detection. This is the same as Figure 9 where the percentage changes are 
demonstrated when an ignition source is also present. The third column shows the cumulative 
effects of a failed gas detector and an ignition source. The posterior probabilities display a very 
similar pattern to the posterior probabilities when there is only an ignition source present as 
shown in Figure 9. However, in this case (the cumulative effects) the posterior probabilities are 
much greater, i.e. the probability of there being an ignition as a consequence (“Y-Ignition”) 
given an ignition source only is 29.34% when compared to the cumulative effects of NGD + 
IS which increases the probability to 44.88%. This shows large percentage increases in the 
probabilities of potential ignition accidents and consequences. Furthermore, it is important to 
state that even though there is a gas detection failure and an ignition source present, the 
probability of there being an ignition accident or consequence is not 100%. This is because the 
relationships between the nodes in the BN takes into account the fact that for an ignition to 
Figure 10: Cumulative effects of “Gas Detection” being “No=100%” and “Ignition Source” being “Yes=100%” on 
“Consequences” (States “Y-Ignition” and “Y-Leak”), “Immediate/Delayed Ignition” (States “Immediate” and “Delayed”), 
“Explosion”, “Fire”, “Damage due to Fire 
No Evidence NGD NGD + IS
Y-Ignition 0.02 0.04 44.88
Y-Leak 64.56 98.74 14.20
Immediate 0.02 0.03 35.38
Delayed 0.03 0.04 49.25
Explosion 0.02 0.03 34.43
Fire 0.01 0.02 20.74
F&Ex Damage 0.00 0.00 3.91
Adjacent Mod. 4.10E-05 6.31E-05 0.0761
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occur there must be an ideal air to fuel mixture. This ideal mixture is approximately 5 – 15% 
of fuel in the air (12). The data for the CPTs in the BN was analysed to compensate for the 
ideal mixture of oxygen to fuel. 
5.2.3 Test Case 3: Effects of observed Consequences (Y-Leak and Y-Ignition) on prior 
probabilities 
In order to provide further verification of the BN model it is important to demonstrate the 
effects of inserting evidence as a consequence and observing the effects on prior nodes. The 
focus node in this test case is the “Consequence” node, with attention being focused on 
inserting 100% evidence to states “Y-Leak” and “Y-Ignition”. The effect of 100% “Y-Leak” 
focuses on the changes in the probabilities of the gas release barriers and continuous release, 
whereas, 100% “Y-Ignition” focuses on the probability changes of the ignition, fire and 
explosion accident and consequence nodes. The “Y-Ignition” analysis does not focus on the 
barriers as the prior probabilities would be the same as the effects demonstrated by 100% “Y-
Leak”.  
Figure 11 demonstrates the effects of 100% occurrence probability of the state “Y-Leak” on the 
prior probabilities of "Fuel Supply off", "TCS Fuel Shut off", "F&G Fuel Shut off", 
"Continuous Gas Release" and “Gas Detection". The graph shows that given 100% probability 
of “Y-Leak”, the prior probabilities concerned with the fuel shut off system nodes (TCS, F&G 
and Fuel Supply off), all being in the state “Yes”, greatly decrease to almost zero. Similarly, 
the probability of the gas being detected also decreases, but not to the extent of the three fuel 
Figure 11: Effects of 100% "Y-Leak" on the prior probabilities of "Fuel Supply off", "TCS Fuel Shut off", "F&G Fuel Shut 
off", "Continuous Gas Release" and “Gas Detection" 
No Evidence Y-Leak
Fuel Supply Off 35.39 0.00
TCS Shut off Fuel 27.76 0.10
F&G Shut off Fuel 20.38 0.03
Continuous Release 62.48 96.19
Gas Detection 43.40 13.44
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shut off nodes. In the event of a gas leak the most likely barrier to fail would be the F&G shut 
off system as it demonstrates the lowest posterior probability of 0.03. However, the barrier that 
displays the most significant change in probability is the gas detection system. Where the TCS 
and F&G system show decreases of 27.76% to 0.1% and 20.38% to 0.03% respectively, and 
the gas detection system demonstrates a total decrease of 29.96% (from 43.4% to 13.44%) This 
indicates that while the fuel shut off systems are the most likely barriers to fail in the event of 
a gas leak, the gas detection system demonstrates the most significant effect on a gas release. 
Finally, the probability of a continuous gas release increases 62.48% to 96.19%. This 
significant increase is to be expected as there is a 100% probability of a leak. The probability 
of a continuous release is not 100% as there is a 13.44% chance that the gas may still be 
detected.  
Figure 12 shows the effects on the prior probabilities of “Ignition Source”, 
“Immediate/Delayed Ignition”, “Fire” and “Explosion” given 100% probability of the 
consequence state “Y-Ignition”. The graph in Figure 12 indicates that prior to a 100% 
consequence of ignition, the likelihood of any ignition, fire and explosion accidents or 
consequences are almost negligible. However, when evidence is inserted into the state “Y-
Ignition” in the consequence node, the prior probabilities greatly increase. The most obvious 
increase is the probability of an ignition source being present, which increases to 100%. This 
is due to an ignition source being required along with the fuel gas in order to have an ignition 
take place. Continually, the probability of there being an immediate or a delayed ignition 
increases from 0.019% and 0.027% to 78.82% and 21.18% respectively. The immediate 
ignition is determined to be the more likely source of the ignition consequence as the delayed 
ignition is more dependent on the ideal mixture of fuel to oxygen. This is also reflected on the 
occurrence probabilities of a fire or explosion. As the probability of a delayed ignition is lower 
than that of an immediate ignition, the probability of a fuel gas fire is greater than the 
probability of an explosion. The probability of there being a fire increases from 0.011% to 
31.69% when compared to the increase for an explosion, from 0.019% to 14.8%. This shows 
that the accident type that contributes the most to the ignition consequence, given that there is 
a fuel gas ignition consequence, is a fuel gas fire.  
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5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is essentially a measure of how responsive or sensitive the output of 
the model is when subject to variations from its inputs. Having the understanding of how a 
model responds to changes in its parameters is important when trying to maximise its potential 
and ensuring correct use of the model. SA provides a degree of confidence that the BN model 
has been built correctly and is working as intended. In the context of this research, SA will be 
used as a demonstration to determine how responsive an event node is to variations in other 
nodes. Knowing the most influential nodes can assist in the experimentation and further 
expansion of the model. Similarly, nodes which have very little influence can be altered or 
discarded (5) (26). 
The SA conducted for the fuel gas release model focuses on the node “Consequences”, more 
specifically, its state “Y-Leak” and the nodes representing the barriers for fuel gas release. 
However, the analysis will be conducted using smaller increases and decreases in the 
probabilities of the parent nodes as opposed to inserting 100% occurrence probability into the 
input node CPTs, as demonstrates in test cases 1, 2 and 3.  
While it is possible to conduct a sensitivity analysis by manually altering the input probabilities 
to observe and record the magnitude of change in the output probabilities, it can be time 
consuming and result in human error regarding the alteration of data. Hence, in this analysis, 
the parameter sensitivity wizard in the Hugin software has been utilised to produce a sensitivity 
analysis. In this program wizard the input node is individually paired with the output node in 
Figure 12: Effects of 100% "Y-Ignition" on the prior probabilities of “Ignition Source”, “Immediate/Delayed Ignition”, 
“Fire” and “Explosion” 
No Evidence Y-Ignition
Ignition Source 0.083 100.00
Imm. 0.019 78.82
Del. 0.027 21.18
Fire 0.011 31.69
Explosion 0.019 14.80
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its desired state. In this case that was “Consequence” in the state “Y-Leak”. A state for each of 
the input nodes was purposely selected. The input nodes for the SA are the barrier nodes; “Gas 
Detection”, “TCS Fuel Shut off”, “F&G System Fuel Shut off” and “Fuel Supply off”. All 
nodes are set to state “Yes” in the parameter sensitivity wizard, with the exception of “Fuel 
Supply off” as this node is the child of “TCS Fuel Shut off” and “F&G Fuel Shut off”. 
Therefore, this node has been set to states “TCS: Yes, F&G: No” and “TCS: No, F&G: Yes”. 
This allows for the sensitivity of this node to be determined given the output of its parent nodes. 
This method is also necessary as in the event both the parent nodes are in states “Yes” or “No”, 
the probability of “Fuel Supply off” is either 1 or 0 and therefore cannot be analysed in the 
sensitivity parameter wizard in the Hugin Software. Following this a sensitivity value from 
Hugin was obtained for each input node, and using Microsoft Excel, a graph was constructed 
to show the results.  
From the graph in Figure 13 it can be seen that the most influential factor on “Consequence: 
Y-Leak” is “Gas Detection”, whilst the least influential is “Fuel Supply off: TCS= No, 
F&G= Yes”. This concurs with the analysis as the node “F&G System Shut off Fuel” has a 
smaller effect on the consequences than the node “TCS Shut off Fuel”. Continually, if the 
probability of “Gas Detection: State - Yes” increases by 10%, then the probability of 
“Consequence: State – Y-Leak” decreases by 4.6%. If the probability of “Fuel Supply off: State 
- TCS= No, F&G= Yes” increases by 10%, then the probability of “Consequence: State – Y-
Figure 13: Sensitivity Functions for the Input Nodes for Event "Consequence" 
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Leak” decreases by 0.8%. From the graph it is also apparent that the sensitivity function is a 
straight line which further adds to the model verification. The sensitivity values computed 
within Hugin are shown in Table 4.  
It is important to state that the sensitivity values are negative as they have a negative effect on 
the focus node “Consequence”. In other words, as the probability of gas detection, for example, 
increases, then the probability that there will be a gas leak decreases. 
Table 4: Sensitivity Values for the Input Nodes for Event "Consequence" 
Input Node Sensitivity Value 
F&G System Shut off Fuel -0.16 
TCS Shut off Fuel -0.23 
Fuel Supply off: ͞TC“=Yes, F&G=No͟ -0.15 
Fuel “upply off: ͞TC“=No, F&G=Yes͟ -0.08 
Gas Detection -0.46 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has outlined a Bayesian Network model which demonstrates the cause and effect 
relationships that several initial failures can have on an offshore electrical generation system. 
With particular attention being focused on the potential for a fuel gas release from the gas 
turbine which drives the electrical generation system. The research presented here progresses 
from the work presented by Loughney & Wang (2017) (5), which illustrates the cause effect 
relationship of one component failure within an electrical generator and the general 
consequences that can result. The BN model presented in this research progresses from this 
research by incorporating part of the demonstrated BN model by Loughney & Wang (2017) 
along with several other initial failures in order to analyse specific consequences in further 
detail. This consequence concerns itself with a possible fuel gas release and the potential fire 
and explosion hazards that can occur. However, while it is easier to demonstrate the effects of 
accidents involving fire and explosion, it is not easy to demonstrate the consequences of a leak 
without an ignition source. These consequences are equally important for offshore platform 
operators due to the improved HSE regulations within Safety Cases regarding hazards to the 
environment in any instance (15). Therefore, in the event that there is a fuel gas leak without 
ignition, it poses a large issue for operators and duty holders given that the release is undetected. 
While it is not as severe as a hydrocarbon release into the sea, it is still vital as it is the ejection 
of natural gas into the atmosphere which can result in consequences to the environment 
depending on the weather conditions.  
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In relation to the verification of the model a sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine 
how responsive the output of the model is to various modifications in the inputs and 
subsequently validate that the model works as expected. This exercise is vital as it provides an 
indication to what the most important variables. In addition, inputs can be ranked or weighted 
in terms of their importance upon the output or final consequences. The more advantageous 
element of conducting SA in BNs is that they take into consideration the chain of events below 
the input node leading to the output node, which presents a closer approximation to reality (5) 
(25) (26). 
The BN model clearly demonstrates that it can provide an effective and applicable method of 
determining the likelihood of various events under uncertainty, and more importantly 
demonstrates its use as a dynamic risk assessment tool. Given the research presented it is now 
much clearer to see the advantages for BNs and Bayesian Theory being applied to create 
dynamic risk assessment tools to operate in conjunction with Safety Cases and other offshore 
installation regulations. 
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Appendix A – CPTs for the BN model 
 
1. Exceed System Capability   4. Structural Support Failure      
Yes 0.0008   Yes 0.0372     
No 0.9992   No 0.9628     
                  
2. Sensor and Instrumentation 
Failure 
  5. Corrosion      
Yes 0.0102   Yes 0.0041     
No 0.9898   No 0.9959     
                  
3. System Defects   Fuel Gas Feed Impact (1)      
Yes 0.0062   Yes 0.0330     
No 0.9938   No 0.9699     
       
                  
6. Control System Failures 
System Yes No 
Operational Yes No Yes No 
Exceed Sys. Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes 0.936 0.734 0.725 0.523 0.477 0.275 0.266 0.064 
No 0.064 0.266 0.275 0.477 0.523 0.725 0.734 0.936 
         
                  
7. Physical/Structural Failures 
Fuel Impact 
(1) 
Yes No 
Corrosion Yes No Yes No 
Structural Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes 0.9640 0.6855 0.6758 0.3973 0.6027 0.3242 0.3145 0.0360 
No 0.0360 0.3145 0.3242 0.6027 0.3973 0.6758 0.6855 0.9640 
         
                  
8. Gas Release in Module         
Control Yes No         
Physical Yes No Yes No         
Yes 0.9502 0.7235 0.8199 0.3816         
No 0.0498 0.2765 0.1801 0.6184         
         
                  
9. Gas Detection             
Release Yes No             
Yes 0.74866 0.00230             
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No 0.25134 0.99770             
                  
         
         
10. TCS Shut Off Fuel   11. F&G System Shut Off Fuel     
Detection Yes No   Detection Yes No     
Yes 0.63212 0.00580   Yes 0.46154 0.00610     
No 0.36788 0.99420   No 0.53846 0.99390     
                  
                  
13. Fuel Supply Shut Off         
F&G Yes No         
TCS Yes No Yes No         
Yes 1 0.99762 0.99563 0         
No 0 0.00238 0.00437 1         
 
12. Continuous Gas Release   14.Ignition Source   
Fuel Off Yes No   Yes 0.00083   
Detection Yes No Yes No   No 0.99917   
Yes 0 0.63212 0.28347 1         
No 1 0.36788 0.71653 0         
         
                  
15. Ignition Type         
Ignition S Yes No         
Fuel Off Yes No Yes No         
Y-Immediate 0 0.3580 0 0         
Y-Delayed 0 0.4984 0 0         
None 1 0.1436 1 1         
         
                  
16. Fire           
Ignition Immediate Delayed None           
Yes 0.35804 0.16400 0           
No 0.64196 0.83600 1           
         
                  
17. Explosion           
Ignition Immediate Delayed None           
Yes 0 0.69904 0           
No 1 0.30096 1           
         
                  
18. Consequence     
Ignition Immediate Delayed None     
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Fuel Off Yes No Yes No Yes No     
Y-Ignition 0 1 0 0.1930 0 0     
Y-Leak Only 0 0 0 0.0003 0 1     
No 1 0 1 0.8067 1 0     
         
19. Equipment Damage due to Fire/Explosion   
20. Explosion Damage to 
Adjacent Areas 
Fire Yes No   Explosion Yes No 
Explosion Yes No Yes No   Yes 0.002211 0 
Yes 0.1930 0.1662 0.0109 0   No 0.99789 1 
No 0.8070 0.8338 0.9891 1         
 
